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Abstract
We analyze a market game where ¯rms choose capacities under
uncertainty about future market conditions and make output choices
after uncertainty has unraveled. We show existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium under imperfect competition and provide an intuitive
characterization of equilibrium investment. We show that investment
in oligopoly, in the ¯rst and second best solution can be unambigu-
ously ranked, in particular investment incentives are highest in the
First Best solution and lowest under imperfect competition. We ¯nally
demonstrate that intervention of a social planer only at the produc-
tion stage leads to strategic uncertainty at the investment stage and
moreover decreases total investment below the level obtained under
imperfect competition.
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11 Introduction
In this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium outcomes in oligopolis-
tic markets where ¯rms make capacity choices under uncertainty about fu-
ture market conditions and decide on output after the state of nature has
unraveled. The fact that in many industries where non storable goods are
produced, capacity is a long run decision, whereas production may be ad-
justed short{run is a natural motivation for our approach.1 Consider, for
example, the electricity sector or the High Tech industry, where production
has to take place just in time, but capacities have to be installed well in
advance. In those markets ¯rms usually face considerable demand and cost
uncertainty when choosing their capacities. This may be due to uncertainty
about the economic trend, about the success of a new product, about future
weather conditions, or fuel prices, to give just a few examples.
As we will show, the consideration of uncertainty about future market
conditions reveals incentive problems that cannot be addressed in a model
with deterministic demand and cost functions. To see this, consider a modi-
¯cation of the game described above where at the second stage ¯rms are reg-
ulated to marginal cost pricing whenever unconstrained (and market clearing
prices obtain if capacities are binding). It is obvious that in both, the original
and the modi¯ed game, if future market conditions were perfectly known, ca-
pacity choices would equal the (one shot) Cournot quantities and ¯rms would
always operate at full capacity. Thus, intervention at the production stage
would be ine®ective, since ¯rms could exercise their market power already
at the investment stage. If capacities are chosen under uncertainty, however,
¯rms will inevitably be unconstrained if demand turns out to be low. Then,
an intervention at the production stage has an impact on the investment
decision. In our particular example, investment incentives would be lower in
the modi¯ed game since being capacity constrained is the more attractive the
lower unconstrained pro¯ts are. The above illustrates that for markets with
considerable demand °uctuations a thorough analysis of regulatory interven-
tions cannot be conducted without modeling the investment stage explicitly
and accounting for the uncertainty ¯rms are facing. Our research aims to
provide the appropriate tools to tackle those issues.
In this paper we develop a rather general and manageable framework
to analyze investment and production choices in an imperfectly competi-
tive environment. We thereby close a gap in the literature between studies
that consider investment incentives in perfectly competitive and monopolis-
1Moreover, our model covers a wide range of scenarios like investment prior to pro-
duction on many successive markets, that may be of interest for applied theoretical or
empirical work. We comment on those issues in the conclusion.
2tic markets2, respectively (which are covered by our model as the extreme
cases). We show that under standard regularity conditions on demand and
cost the Cournot two stage market game (where ¯rms invest in capacity under
uncertainty about future market conditions and produce when uncertainty
has unraveled) always has a unique equilibrium. Equilibrium investment in
the Cournot outcome can be characterized by an intuitive ¯rst order condi-
tion that implies that marginal revenue generated by an additional unit of
capacity equals marginal investment cost.
In order to asses the impact of strategic behavior on investment incen-
tives and welfare, we also consider the First Best and a Second Best scenario:
the First Best solution speci¯es welfare maximizing capacities and produc-
tion schedules, while the Second Best solution speci¯es welfare maximizing
capacity choices given that ¯rms engage in Cournot competition at the pro-
duction stage. We show that total capacity in the First Best is higher than
total capacity in the Second Best solution, which still exceeds equilibrium
investment in the Cournot two stage market game. Our results con¯rm the
common perception that in oligopolistic markets there is clearly a role for
investment enhancing mechanisms (like capacity obligations or capacity mar-
kets).
The second main objective of our work is to provide a framework that
allows to shed light on the impact of regulatory intervention only at the pro-
duction stage on investment incentives and welfare. In order to elaborate
on this issue, we consider capacity choices by strategic ¯rms that anticipate
optimal regulation at the production stage given the capacities chosen.We
provide an intuitive characterization of investment in any symmetric equilib-
rium. However, existence (but not even uniqueness) of equilibrium can only
be shown for the case of constant marginal production cost. Moreover, in any
symmetric equilibrium of the game with optimal regulation at the produc-
tion stage, total investment is even lower than in the Cournot market game.
Our results have two important implications: First, intervention only at the
production stage gives rise to multiple, and possibly asymmetric equilibria of
the game, and thereby generates strategic uncertainty for the ¯rms. Second,
it is not even clear that such an intervention is welfare enhancing since it
decreases total capacity in the industry. We conclude that interventions only
at the production stage have to be carefully reconsidered in markets with
2The literature on peak{load pricing provides a characterization of investment in those
cases. However, the approach used does not allow to analyze the strategic interaction of
¯rms. See, for example, Crew and Kleindorfer (1986) or Crew, Fernando, and Kleindorfer
(1994) for an overview. Another related direction of research analyzes production decisions
under demand uncertainty in perfectly competitive and monopolistic markets. See Dreze
and Gabszewicz (1967), Dreze and Sheshinski (1976), Leland (1972), or Sandmo (1971).
3highly °uctuating demand.3
In the economic literature, capacity choice has been extensively analyzed
prior to price competition. This literature was initiated by the seminal article
of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), and has been generalized and extended by
many authors, among others by Osborne and Pitchik (1986). Reynolds and
Wilson (2000) use the latter to analyze capacity choice prior to Bertrand com-
petition when demand is uncertain. Their analysis reveals that symmetric
pure strategy equilibria (in capacities) do not exist unless cost of investment
is so high that ¯rms want to be constrained in any demand scenario.
Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) analyze investment under demand uncer-
tainty prior to quantity competition in a framework where both, demand
and marginal cost are linear, and compare it to equilibrium production given
the expected demand (which they call the "Certainty Equivalent Game").4
Our analysis in section 3 includes their model as a special case. However, in
terms of generality and technical tractability our approach goes far beyond
the one of Gabszewicz and Poddar.5
Other papers that investigate investment incentives prior to imperfectly
competitive markets were mainly motivated by the liberalization of the elec-
tricity sector, where investment incentives have recently become a central
issue in the policy debate [see, for example, Murphy and Smeers (2003)]. As
a response to the common perception of too low investment incentives, vari-
ous mechanisms have been proposed to raise investments [see e. g. Cramton
and Stoft (2005), or Bushnell (2005) for an overview]. These approaches are
well in line with our result that investment is generally too low prior to imper-
fectly competitive markets. The current policy debate on electricity markets
also provides motivation for our second scenario. There is a huge literature
that asks whether the ¯rms abuse market power in the spot market and |
if so | whether regulatory intervention is desirable.6 Our results point out
3Note that our analysis abstracts from many problems that additionally have to be
considered when judging the welfare e®ects of a particular regulatory policy. Still we
provide a framework that can be used in order to explicitly analyze di®erent (more realistic)
scenarios at stage two. Examples are the analysis of price cap regulation in Zoettl (2005)
or of forward markets prior to spot market competition in Grimm and Zoettl (2005).
4In order to relate the results of Gabszewicz and Poddar to ours, in appendix B we
analyze a more general version of their "Certainty Equivalent Game".
5Our primary goal was to provide a tool to analyze di®erent forms of market orga-
nization on investment incentives. This cannot be achieved by the model of Gabszewicz
and Poddar, since their discrete approach to model demand uncertainty does not allow
to show uniqueness of equilibrium, to analyze an arbitrary number of ¯rms, to use more
general demand and cost functions, and ¯nally does not yield intuitive characterizations
of equilibria.
6See, for example, Wolfram (1999) or Joskow and Kahn (2002).
4that investment incentives may be strongly a®ected by such an intervention
and thus, the welfare e®ect may be unclear.
Our paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we state the model. In
section 3 we show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for the Cournot
two stage market game. Then, in section 4, we characterize the ¯rst best
solution. Section 5 is devoted to intervention of a planer at only one of the
two stages: We characterize the socially optimal capacity levels given that
¯rms compete µ a la Cournot at the production stage (second best solution)
in section 5.1. In section 5.2, we analyze the incentives to invest in case the
constrained social optimum is implemented at the production stage. Section
6 contains our main result, an unambiguous ranking of total investment in
all scenarios mentioned above. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze a two stage market game where ¯rms have to choose production
capacities under demand and cost uncertainty, and make output choices after
market conditions unraveled. Uncertainty is represented by a parameter £
that is distributed on the domain [µ;µ] according to c.d.f. F(µ) with the
corresponding density f(µ) = Fµ(µ).7 We denote by q = (q1;:::;qn) the
vector of outputs of the n ¯rms, and by Q =
Pn
i=1 qi total quantity produced
in the market. Market demand in scenario µ 2 [µ;µ] is given by P(¢;µ).
Moreover, all ¯rms have the same cost function in scenario µ, which we
denote by C(¢;µ).8 We make the following regularity assumptions:
Assumption 1 (i) Market demand in scenario µ has a ¯nite satiation
point Q(µ), i. e. P(Q;µ) = 0 for all Q ¸ Q(µ). Moreover, for each µ
there exists a prohibitive price P(µ), such that P(0;µ) · P(µ).
(ii) P(Q;µ) is twice continuously di®erentiable in Q with P(Q;µ) > 0 and
Pq(Q;µ) < 0 for all Q 2 [0;Q(µ)) and µ 2 (µ;µ].
(iii) C(qi;µ) is twice continuously di®erentiable in qi with Cq(qi;µ) ¸ 0 and
Cqq(qi;µ) ¸ 0 for all µ 2 [µ;µ].
7Throughout the paper we denote the derivative of a function g(x;y) with respect to
an argument z, z = x;y, by gz(x;y), the second derivative with respect to that argument
by gzz(x;y), and the cross derivative by gxy(x;y).
8Note that P and C may depend on independent random events. Then, F(¢) approx-
imates the distribution over all potential states of nature that may result from the two
random draws.
5(iv) P(Q;µ) satis¯es Pq(Q;µ) + Pqq(Q;µ)qi < 0 for all µ 2 [µ;µ] and all
qi 2 [0;Q ¡ Q¡i].9
(v) Both, P(Q;µ) and C(qi;µ) are di®erentiable in µ with P(0;µ) =
C(0;µ) = 0 and Pµ(Q;µ) ¡ Cqµ(qi) > 0.
(vi) P(Q;µ)qi ¡ C(qi;µ) is (di®erentiable) strict supermodular in qi and µ,
i. e.
d2[P(Q;µ)qi¡C(qi;µ)]
dqidµ > 0 for all i, µ, and q¡i.
The situation we want to analyze is captured by the following two stage
game:
At stage one ¯rms simultaneously build up capacities x = (x1;:::;xn) 2
[0;Q(µ)]. Capacity choices are observed by all ¯rms. Cost of investment
K(xi) is the same for all ¯rms and satis¯es
Assumption 2 (Investment Cost) Investment cost K(xi) is twice con-
tinuously di®erentiable, with Kx(xi) ¸ 0 and Kxx(xi) ¸ 0.





[P(0;µ) ¡ C(0;µ)]dF(µ): (1)
That is, we assume that the consumers' expected willingness to pay for the
"¯rst unit" of capacity is always higher than the cost of the ¯rst unit of
investment. Note that if the condition does not hold, no ¯rm invests in
capacity.
At stage two, facing the capacity constraints inherited from stage one,
¯rms simultaneously choose outputs at the spot market. Since demand un-
certainty unravels prior to the output decision, produced quantities depend
on the realized demand scenario. We denote individual quantities produced




Finally, we state ¯rm i's stage one expected pro¯t from operating if capac-
ities are given by x and ¯rms plan to choose feasible10 production schedules






















dF (µ) ¡ K (xi): (2)




10That is, 0 · qF
i (µ) · xi for all µ 2 [µ;µ], i = 1;:::;n.
63 Imperfect Competition
In this section we analyze the two stage market game where at stage one
¯rms simultaneously invest in capacity under uncertainty about future mar-
ket conditions and at stage two, when uncertainty has unraveled, decide on
production. We call this game the Cournot market game and refer to the
equilibrium investments and quantities as the Cournot outcome.
In this section we show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium of the
Cournot market game and provide and intuitive characterization of equilib-
rium investment. In the following | using backward induction | we proceed
in two steps: we ¯rst analyze the equilibria at stage two for all possible in-
vestment levels and then characterize equilibrium capacity choices.
Production Stage In the ¯rst step we characterize equilibrium outputs
of the capacity constrained Cournot games at each µ 2 [µ;µ] given invest-
ment choices x. Note that in order to analyze all possible continuation
games we have to consider also asymmetric investments. In order to sim-
plify the exposition we will order the ¯rms according to their investment
levels, i. e. x1 · x2 · ¢¢¢ · xn, throughout the paper.
An equilibrium of the capacity constrained Cournot game at stage two in
scenario µ given x, qC(x;µ), satis¯es simultaneously for all ¯rms
q
C







s.t. 0 · q · xi: (3)
Note that due to assumption 1, part (v), all ¯rms are unconstrained for values
of µ close to µ. By assumption 1 parts (ii) to (iv), the unconstrained Cournot
equilibrium [which we denote by ~ qC0(µ)] is unique and symmetric for each
µ 2 [µ;µ].11 From (3) it follows that ~ qC0








i = Cq(~ q
C0
i ;µ):
Now as µ increases, at some critical value that we denote by µC1(x), ¯rm 1
(the one with the lowest capacity) becomes constrained. The critical demand
scenario is implicitly determined by x1 = qC0
1 (µC1). If it holds that x1 < x2,
then at µC1(x) only ¯rm one becomes constrained. Then, in equilibrium,
¯rm 1 produces at its capacity bound whereas the remaining ¯rms produce
their equilibrium output of the Cournot game among n ¡ 1 ¯rms given the
residual demand P(Q ¡ x1;µ) [denoted by ~ qC1
i (x;µ)], which solves the ¯rst
11See, for example Selten (1970), or Vives (2001), pp. 97/98.
7order condition
P(x1 + (n ¡ 1)~ q
C1




i = Cq(~ q
C1
i ;µ):
The capacity constrained Cournot equilibrium in the case where one ¯rm is
constrained is a vector qC1(x;µ), where qC1
i (x;µ) = minfxi; ~ qC1(x;µ)g.
As µ increases further, we pass through n+1 cases, from case C0 (no ¯rm
is constrained) to case Cn (all n ¯rms are constrained). Note that two critical
values µCm(x) and µCm+1(x) coincide whenever xm = xm+1, and that it holds
that µCm(x) < µCm+1(x) (by assumption 1 part (v)) whenever xm < xm+1.
Now we are prepared to characterize the capacity constrained Cournot
equilibrium in case Cm where m ¯rms are constrained. In this case, the m
¯rms with the lowest capacities produce at their capacity bound, whereas
































The equilibrium quantities of the capacity constrained Cournot game in case
Cm are given by
q
Cm
i (x;µ) = minfxi; ~ q
Cm
i (x;µ)g; (5)






























if i > m:
(7)
Note that it holds that
d¼Cm
i
dxi > 0 only if i · m, and
d¼Cm
i
dxi = 0 otherwise, since
a ¯rm's capacity expansion only a®ects production at stage two in case the
¯rm was constrained. Obviously, in this case the derivative must be positive.
Investment Stage Now we are prepared to analyze capacity choices at
the investment stage. The results obtained for the production stage enable
8us to derive a ¯rm i's pro¯t from investing xi, given that the other ¯rms
invest x¡i and quantity choices at stage two are given by qCm(x;µ) for µ 2
[µCm(x);µCm+1(x)]. Recall that when choosing capacities the ¯rms still face
demand uncertainty. Thus, a ¯rm's pro¯t from given levels of investments, x,
is the integral over equilibrium pro¯ts at each µ given x on the domain [µ;µ],
taking into account the probability distribution over the demand scenarios.
For each µ, ¯rms anticipate equilibrium play at the production stage, which
gives rise to one of the n + 1 types of equilibria, EQC0, ..., EQCm, ...,
EQCn. Note that, by assumption 1, part (v), any x > 0 gives rise to the
unconstrained equilibrium if µ is close enough to µ. As µ increases, more
and more ¯rms become constrained. Thus, a tuple of investment levels that
initially gave rise to an EQC0, then leads to an equilibrium where ¯rst one
(then two, three, ..., and ¯nally n) ¯rms are constrained. In order to simplify
the exposition we again make use of the de¯nitions µC0 ´ µ and µCn+1 ´ µ.









i (x;µ)dF(µ) ¡ K(xi): (8)
Note that at each critical value µCm, m = 1;:::;n it holds that














dF (µ) ¡ Kx (xi) (9)
Note that if all ¯rms invest the same, then it holds that either all ¯rms are
constrained, or none, i. e. µC1 = µC2 = ¢¢¢ = µCn. This implies that for
symmetric investment the ¯rst order condition coincides for all ¯rms. We
are able to show the following
Lemma 1 (Cournot (C)) The Cournot market game has a unique equilib-
rium which is symmetric. Equilibrium investments xC
i = 1



























12Note that it is never optimal for a ¯rm to be unconstrained at µ and thus, we always
obtain µCn · µ.
13Note that continuity of ¼i implies that due to Leibnitz' rule the derivatives of the
integration limits cancel out. Moreover ¼Cm
i only changes in xi if ¯rm i is constrained
in scenario FBm, i. e. i · m. Thus, the sum does not include the cases where ¯rm i is
unconstrained, i. e. m < i.
9Proof See appendix A.1. ¤
Let us emphasize two important aspects of our results: First, we could
show that under standard regularity assumptions the Cournot market game
has a unique equilibrium. Second, we ¯nd that (symmetric) equilibrium in-
vestment can be characterized by a rather intuitive condition, (10). The
condition simply says that expected marginal revenue generated by an ad-
ditional unit of capacity must equal marginal cost of investment. When
calculating the marginal revenue of capacity, however, one has to take into
account that additional capacity a®ects a ¯rm's revenue only in those states
of nature where capacity was binding. Thus, expectation must only be taken
with respect to those scenarios in which the ¯rms are capacity constrained,
i. e. over the interval [µCn ¡
xC¢
;µ], and not over the whole domain of £.
4 First Best
In order to be able to assess the impact of market power on investment
incentives, in this section we characterize the ¯rst best solution, that is,
welfare optimal capacity levels and output choices given the number of ¯rms
in the market. Again we proceed in two steps: We ¯rst characterize the
socially optimal production plan at stage two for all possible investment
levels and then characterize socially optimal investment at stage one.
We moreover show that if ¯rms do not act strategically, investment and
production levels coincide with the ¯rst best (socially optimal) solution, again
given the number of ¯rms. Later, in section 6, we provide a comparison of
investment under the First Best solution and in the Cournot outcome.
Production Stage We start with the characterization of the socially op-
timal production plan at stage two, given the capacities chosen at stage one,
which may di®er across ¯rms. Recall that we order the ¯rms according to
their investment levels, i. e. x1 · x2 · ¢¢¢ · xn. In the following we specify,
for a given vector of capacities x, the optimal production schedule for any
possible demand scenario (that is, for any possible value of µ).14
Note that due to assumption 1, part (v), all ¯rms are unconstrained for
values of µ close to µ. It is straightforward to show that in the welfare opti-
mum, all unconstrained ¯rms produce the same (due to convex cost). Thus,
the socially optimal total quantity of each ¯rm if all ¯rms are unconstrained
is given by qFB0
i (µ) = fqi 2 R : P(nqi;µ) = Cq (qi;µ)g.
14With convex cost a characterization of the welfare optimum could probably be given
with less mathematical burden. However, we will need the characterization developed here
also in section 5.2.
10Now, as µ increases, at some critical value, that we denote by µFB1(x),
¯rm 1 (the lowest capacity ¯rm) becomes constrained. The critical de-
mand scenario µFB1(x) is implicitly de¯ned by x1 = qFB0
1 (µFB1). If it holds
that x1 < x2, then at µFB1(x) only ¯rm 1 becomes constrained and the
socially optimal production plan implies that ¯rm 1 produces at its ca-
pacity bound whereas the remaining ¯rms produce the unconstrained op-
timal quantity given the residual demand P(Q ¡ x1;µ), i. e. ~ qFB1
i (x;µ) =
fqi 2 R : P((n ¡ 1)qi + x1;µ) = Cq (qi;µ)g. The optimal production plan
in scenario FB1 is a vector qFB1(x;µ), where each element is given by
qFB1
i (x;µ) = minfxi; ~ qFB1
i (x;µ)g.
As µ increases further and more ¯rms become constrained, we pass
through n+1 cases, from case FB0 (no ¯rm is constrained) to case FBn (all n
¯rms are constrained). Note that two critical values µFBm(x) and µFBm+1(x)
coincide whenever xm = xm+1, and that it holds that µFBm(x) < µFBm+1(x)
(by assumption 1 part (v)) whenever xm < xm+1.
Now we are prepared to characterize the socially optimal production plan
and social welfare generated in case FBm, where m ¯rms are constrained.
In this case, the m ¯rms with the lowest capacities produce at their capacity
bound, whereas the n ¡ m unconstrained ¯rms produce the unconstrained
optimal quantity given the residual demand P(Q ¡
Pm














We denote the optimal production plan in case FBm by qFBm(x;µ) where
each element is given by
q
FBm
i (x;µ) = minfxi; ~ q
FBm
i (x;µ)g i = 1;:::;n: (12)








All this allows us ¯nally to pin down maximal social welfare generated in
demand scenario µ 2 [µFBm;µFBm+1] (where, given x, the m lowest capacity















Note that W FBm only depends on xi if ¯rm i is constrained in scenario m,
that is if i · m.
11Investment Stage Let us now characterize the welfare maximizing level
of investment. Total expected welfare is obtained by integrating over all
demand realizations. Since the functional form of the maximal attainable
welfare changes as we pass from case FBm to case FBm + 1, we have to
integrate piecewisely. In order to facilitate exposition, we de¯ne µFB0 = µ
and µFBn+1 = µ. Then, welfare generated by the choice of capacities x, given












Note that at each critical value µFBm, m = 1;:::;n, it holds that











dF (µ) ¡ Kx (xi): (16)
Obviously, the n ¯rst order conditions are simultaneously satis¯ed for all
¯rms if all ¯rms invest the same. We can show the following
Lemma 2 (First Best (FB)) In the welfare optimum, each ¯rm invests
xFB
i = 1
























Proof See appendix A.2. ¤
We obtain a rather intuitive characterization also of the ¯rst best invest-
ment level. The condition says that in the welfare optimum capacity should
be chosen such that expected marginal social welfare of additional capac-
ity [LHS of (17)] should equal marginal cost of investment [RHS of (17)].
Again it is important to notice that expectation is only taken over those
scenarios where the ¯rms are actually constrained given the scheduled stage
two{production, that is, over the interval [µFBn(xFB);µ].
Remark 1 (Non-Strategic Firms) For each number of ¯rms, n, if ¯rms
do not behave strategically (i. e. they act as price takers at stage two and
ignore their impact on total capacity at stage one), ¯rms invest and produce
optimally from a social welfare point of view.
Proof See appendix A.3 ¤
125 Partial Intervention
This section is thought to shed light on the e®ects that intervention at only
one of the two stages has on investment incentives. In the following sec-
tion (5.1) we consider implementation of the welfare optimal capacity level
at stage one given that ¯rms strategically choose their outputs at the pro-
duction stage (Second Best). In section 5.2 we analyze strategic capacity
choices if ¯rms anticipate implementation of the welfare optimal production
schedule given the capacities chosen at stage two (Optimal Regulation at the
Production stage, ORP).15 Table 2 relates those scenarios to the scenarios
already analyzed in sections 3 and 4.




at the Pro¯t XC XORP
Investment Second Best First Best
Stage Welfare XSB XFB
Table 1: The four scenarios analyzed.
5.1 Second Best
In order to investigate whether the capacity choices of strategic ¯rms are
locally ine±cient, in this section we characterize the socially optimal invest-
ment levels given that ¯rms play the capacity constrained Cournot equilib-
rium at the production stage. Later, in section 6, we will provide a compar-
ison with capacity levels in the First Best and in the Cournot outcome.
If, at stage two, ¯rms play the capacity constrained Cournot equilib-
rium16 qCm
i (x;µ), i = 1;:::;n, aggregate production in case Cm is given by
QCm(x;µ) as de¯ned in (6). Consequently, total welfare generated in demand











15We abstract from all informational problems by assuming that a social planer imple-
ments the welfare optimum at one stage given that ¯rms behave strategically at the other
one.
16See the characterization provided in section 3.
13Note that W Cm(x;µ) depends on xi only if ¯rm i is constrained in case Cm,
i. e. if i · m, or, equivalently, qCm
i (x;µ) = xi.
Welfare generated by the choice of capacities x, given that the ¯rms play












Note that at each critical value µCm, m = 1;:::;n, it holds that











dF (µ) ¡ Kx (xi) (20)
Obviously, the n ¯rst order conditions are simultaneously satis¯ed for all
¯rms if all ¯rms invest the same. We can indeed show the following
Lemma 3 (Second Best (SB)) The capacities xSB
i = 1
nXSB, i = 1;:::;n,

























Proof See appendix A.4. ¤
5.2 Optimal Regulation at the Production Stage
In order to investigate the impact of stage two{intervention on capacity
choices in oligopolistic markets, we analyze strategic capacity choices at stage
one given that ¯rms anticipate that at stage two the socially optimal solu-
tion is implemented (e.g. by a social planer). A comparison of equilibrium
investment in this scenario with investments in the First Best, Second Best,
and Cournot solution is provided in section 6.
If the competitive outcome is implemented at stage two, outputs coincide
with the welfare maximizing quantities characterized in equation (12). Thus,
a ¯rm i's stage two{pro¯t in scenario µ 2 [µFBm(x);µFBm+1(x)] where ¯rms






















if i > m:
14The stage one expected pro¯t of ¯rm i is obtained by integrating over all









i (x;µ)dF(µ) ¡ K (xi): (22)













dF (µ) ¡ Kx (xi): (23)
Again, we immediately see that if investment is symmetric across ¯rms, only
the last integral in (23) remains positive. We show the following
Lemma 4 (Optimal Regulation at the Production Stage (ORP))
(i) In any symmetric equilibrium of the game where the competitive out-
come is implemented at stage two, ¯rms choose capacities xORP
i =
1


























(ii) Suppose that marginal cost Cq(q;µ) is constant in q. Then , there exists
at least one symmetric equilibrium, but there may be more than one.
No asymmetric equilibria exist.
(iii) The game always has a unique symmetric (degenerate) equilibrium if
XC · ~ QC0(µ), i. e. capacity in the Cournot outcome is lower than
the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium production at µ. In such an
equilibrium ¯rms are constrained at any µ 2 [µ;µ].
Proof See appendix A.5 ¤
Note that we cannot prove existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equi-
librium in the general case while for constant marginal cost existence (but
not uniqueness) can be shown. The basic problem is that in neither case
the stage one pro¯t is quasiconcave, which makes standard analysis impos-
sible. In the case of linear marginal cost, however, we can exploit recent
insights on oligopolistic competition that makes use of lattice theory (Amir
and Lambson (2000)). In the general case (i. e. strictly convex production
15cost), however, the game cannot be reformulated as a supermodular game
and thus, even more sophisticated techniques do not help.
Finally let us draw the reader's attention to the degenerate case men-
tioned in part (iii) of the lemma. There we show that the game with optimal
regulation at stage two always has a unique equilibrium in case that even
in the Cournot market game (see section 3) ¯rms always want to be con-
strained, even at the lowest realization of µ. In section 6 we will provide
further intuition on this special case.
6 Comparison of Investment Levels
In this section compare equilibrium investments in the scenarios analyzed in
sections 3 to 5. Moreover, in the discussion of our result we demonstrate how
the approach can be used to easily obtain insights on the e®ect that regulatory
intervention or market re{organization have on investment incentives, far
beyond the stylized scenarios we analyzed.
Theorem 1 Suppose that assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(i) For any ¯nite number of ¯rms, n, it holds that
{ Capacity in the Cournot outcome is too low from a social welfare
point of view, i. e. XSB
n > XC
n .
{ Capacity in any symmetric stage two{regulated outcome is lower
than in the Cournot outcome, i. e. XC
n ¸ XORP
n .
{ The ¯rst best solution yields the highest capacity level among all
scenarios.





(ii) As the number of ¯rms approaches in¯nity, investment levels in all





Proof Part (i) Consider the ¯rst order conditions that implicitly de¯ne
total capacities in the four scenarios considered, as given in lemmas 1 to 4.
Note that (i) Pq(X;µ) < 0, (ii) µCn(x) > µFBn(x) for all x17, and that (iii) at
(below, above) the demand realization µCn(xC) we have that Pq(XC;µ)XC
n +
17The latter is due to the fact that ¯rms get already constrained at lower demand
realizations if they behave competitively and therefore produce where demand equals
marginal cost.
16P(XC;µ) ¡ Cq( 1
nXC;µ) = 0 (< 0; > 0). Thus, the lefthand{sides of the ¯rst



















































Note that according to lemmas 1 to 4, the total capacities are deter-





Z 2 fFB; SB; C; ORPg. Recall that in all cases we get interior solutions
and note that the above terms (except for the one that determines XORP)
are decreasing in X, while Kx is increasing in X. This immediately implies
XFB ¸ XSB > XC.
In order to see why the ranking stated in the theorem also holds for
ORP, note that the above term in scenario C is strictly decreasing in X,
whereas in scenario ORP it satis¯es LHS(0) > Kx(0) (by assumption 2)
and LHS(X) < Kx(X) for X high enough (by assumption 1 (i)). Since
Kx(X) is increasing in X, this immediately implies that for any equilibrium
investment XORP it holds that XC ¸ XORP.
Part (ii) As n approaches in¯nity, all ¯rst order conditions collapse to
R µ
µ [P(X;µ) ¡ Cq(0;µ)]dF(µ) = Kx(0). ¤
In the following we derive exact conditions under which the weak inequal-
ities from theorem 1 are strict, and hold with equality, respectively. They
hold with equality whenever already the capacity choice determines produc-
tion in any demand scenario µ 2 [µ;µ], that is, if ¯rms are always constrained
at the production stage. In particular:
Theorem 2 (Degenerate Cases) Suppose f(µ) > 0 for all µ 2 [µ;µ].
Then it holds18
(i) XC · ~ QC0(µ) , XC = XORP,
(ii) XFB · ~ QC0(µ) , XFB = XSB.
18The assumption f(µ) > 0 is only needed for the "("-direction. ")" always holds.
17Proof Let x0 be a vector of equal capacities summing up to X0. We
have µ · µFBn(x0) · µCn(x0) for all x0 and both, µFBn(x0) and µCn(x0) are
increasing in X0.
(i) If XC · ~ QC0(µ), then µ = µCn(xC). This implies that µ = µFBn(xORP) =
µCn(xC) (since XORP · XC). Then the ¯rst order conditions (10) and (24)
collapse since the lower limit of integration is given by µ. This proves ")".
In order to prove "(", note that XC > ~ QC0(µ) implies µ · µFBn(xORP) <
µCn(xC).19 Then the the lower limit of integration in ¯rst order conditions
(10) and (24) does not coincide which implies XORP < XC if f(µ) > 0 for
all µ 2 [µ;µ].
(ii) The proof works analogously to part (i). ¤
Genuine Uncertainty Degenerate Cases
~ QC0(µ) < XC XC · ~ QC0(µ) < XFB XFB · ~ QC0(µ)
XORP < XC XORP = XC
XSB < XFB XSB = XFB
Table 2: Degenerate Cases and Equivalence of Scenarios.
If condition (i) of theorem 2 holds, in the Cournot market game (section
3) ¯rms want to be constrained at the production stage in any state of nature
µ 2 [µ;µ]. Since the incentive to be constrained is higher in case of optimal
regulation at stage two, the solutions of C and ORP collapse in this case.
Moreover, comparison with a result by Reynolds and Wilson (2000) shows
that under condition (i) also a game where ¯rms invest prior to Bertrand
competition at stage two yields the same capacity as C and ORP.20
This result is well known in the absence of uncertainty (when obviously
condition (i) is always satis¯ed). In this case, the equivalence of the Cournot
and the Bertrand outcome has already been shown by Kreps and Scheinkman
19Note that whenever µ < µCn(xC), then it holds that µFBn(xORP) < µCn(xC).
20Reynolds and Wilson show that under condition (i) capacity choice prior to Bertrand
competition yields the same outcome as capacity choice in a game where ¯rms cannot
adjust their production after uncertainty unraveled. It is easy to show that under condition
(i) the latter game yields the same outcome as our Cournot market game (which clearly is
not the case if condition (i) does not hold). Reynolds and Wilson fail to recognize, however,
their this game does not have a unique equilibrium in case of genuine uncertainty (which
is why part (ii) of their theorem is incomplete).
18(1983). Our results show that those ¯ndings also hold under a weaker con-
dition that basically imposes a restriction on the variance of µ. Obviously,
condition (i) describes a degenerate environment where uncertainty does not
matter much. Under genuine uncertainty, where ¯rms are unconstrained in
at least some states of nature, our analysis demonstrates that in fact market
organization at stage two matters a lot.21
If condition (ii) holds, at the welfare maximizing (First Best) capacity
level even strategic ¯rms are constrained in any demand scenario µ 2 [µ;µ]
at stage two. Notice that condition (ii) is stronger than condition (i) [since
XFB > XC, as we have shown in theorem 1]. Consequently, (ii) can only hold
in a degenerate environment where uncertainty is not an important issue.
Why the level of uncertainty is not the only decisive factor for a equiva-
lence of XFB and XSB can best be illustrated in case of certain demand. At
the production stage, strategic ¯rms play either their Cournot quantity given
marginal production cost, or their capacity, whichever is lower. This implies
that even under certainty the First Best and the Second Best outcome co-
incide only in those cases where the First Best capacity level is below the
Cournot quantities at stage two. Thus, condition (ii) requires that marginal
capacity cost is su±ciently high compared to marginal production cost and
that uncertainty does not matter much. As we have shown in our analysis,
however, under genuine uncertainty the First Best solution always implies
higher investment than the second best solution, independent of marginal
capacity and production cost.
Let us ¯nally draw the reader's attention to the particular structure of
all four ¯rst order conditions. They all equalize marginal pro¯t or welfare of
additional capacity [LHSs of the ¯rst order conditions as listed in equation
(25)] with marginal cost of capacity [RHS] (see lemmas 1 to 4). Note that
the stage one{objective is re°ected only in the integrand at the LHS while
the stage two{objective enters exclusively into the lower limit of integration.
That is, we integrate over marginal pro¯t in cases where the ¯rms maximize
pro¯ts at stage one (C and ORP) and over marginal welfare in cases where
welfare is the stage one-objective (FB and SB). The game at stage two
enters only in form of the lower limit of integration, which is the state of
nature from which on ¯rms are constrained given the capacities chosen at
stage one (i. e. µCn(x) in the case of Cournot competition at stage two and
µFBn(x) if the welfare optimum is implemented).
21For the Bertrand market game Reynolds and Wilson (2000) show that under genuine
uncertainty equilibria with equal capacities of the ¯rms do not exist.
197 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided a general model of strategic investment deci-
sions under uncertainty prior to imperfectly competitive markets. We have
shown existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and provided an intuitive
characterization of equilibrium investment. We found that increasing capac-
ity is desirable from a social welfare point of view. We also demonstrated
that intervention only at the production stage leads to strategic uncertainty
at the investment stage and, moreover, decreases total investment. Thus, in
markets with considerable demand °uctuations, (partial) intervention only
at the market stage has to be carefully reconsidered.
The particular structure of the ¯rst order conditions discussed at the
end of the previous section moreover allows several conjectures about the
desirability of interventions at either stage one or stage two. First, our model
suggests that any stage two{intervention which increases production above
the level obtained in the Cournot outcome in every state of the world reduces
investment. Second, increasing the capacity above the level freely chosen by
the ¯rms is desirable from a social welfare point of view whenever ¯rms
exercise market power to some extent at the production stage.
While the model provides a solid intuition for how investment incentives
and welfare are a®ected by regulatory intervention, speci¯c market designs
under consideration still have to be analyzed carefully in order to obtain
reliable policy conclusions. In this respect, our model provides a tractable
framework for the analysis of di®erent scenarios at the market stage. The
framework captures the stylized fact that at the time when they make their
investment decisions ¯rms face considerable uncertainty both about future
demand and production cost, and probably also with respect to future regu-
latory regimes. Let us outline several directions of research that can directly
bene¯t from the analysis done in this paper.
The most obvious application of the model is to modify the game played
at the second stage in order to analyze how di®erent market designs or regu-
latory interventions a®ect investment incentives and welfare. However, mod-
eling a more complicated strategic context at the production stage usually
comes at the cost of loosing some generality (i. e. restriction to linear de-
mand). Grimm and Zoettl (2005) analyze how investment incentives are
a®ected by the introduction of forward markets prior to spot trading and
Zoettl (2005) considers price cap regulation at the spot market. Whereas
the results of Grimm and Zoettl (2005) con¯rm the intuition that making
the spot market more competitive decreases investments, Zoettl (2005) ¯nds
that price caps at stage two may actually increase investment incentives. The
reason is that price caps eliminate an important feature of the present model,
20i. e. prices do not rise in case of insu±cient capacity, which crucially a®ects
the incentives.
A second line of research for which the current model serves as a starting
point is the analysis of capacity expansion, probably even allowing the choice
between di®erent technologies. On the one hand, such a model would allow
to analyze the e®ect of measures like emission permits in electricity markets
that a®ect variable costs of di®erent technologies to di®erent extents. On
the other hand it could serve as the theoretical benchmark that allows to
estimate market power at the investment stage.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We prove the lemma in two parts. In part I we show existence and in part
II uniqueness of the equilibrium. For the proof we ¯rst need to establish the
following
Property 1 (Monotonicity of µCm)
dµCm(x)
dxi is strictly positive if i ·
m, and zero otherwise.
Proof µCm(x) is the demand realization from which on ¯rm m cannot play
its unconstrained output any more. At µCm(x) it holds that qC
i (µCm(x)) =
~ qCm(µCm(x)) = xm for all i ¸ m and qC
i (µCm(x)) = xi < xm for all i < m.


















Di®erentiation with respect to xi, i < m, yields
Pq (¢) + Pµ (¢)
dµCm (x)
dxi













Pq (¢) + Pqq (¢)xm
Pµ (¢) + Pqµ (¢)xm ¡ Cqµ (¢)
> 0
due to assumption 1, parts (iv) and (vi) [note that the expression in the
denominator is the cross derivative which was assumed to be positive in part
(vi) of assumption 1].
21Di®erentiation with respect to xi, i = m, yields
(n ¡ m + 2)Pq (¢) + Pµ (¢)
dµCm (x)
dxi
+(n ¡ m + 1)Pqq (¢)xm + Pxµ (¢)xm
dµCm (x)
dxi










(n ¡ m + 2)Pq (¢) + (n ¡ m + 1)Pqq (¢)xm ¡ Cxx (¢)
Pµ (¢) + Pqµ (¢)xm ¡ Cqµ (¢)
> 0;
also due to assumption 1, parts (iv) and (vi). Finally, di®erentiation with













dxi = 0 for i > m. ¤
PartI: Existence of Equilibrium In the following we show that a sym-
metric equilibrium of the two stage Cournot market game exists, and that
equilibrium choices xC
i = 1
nXC, i = 1;:::;n, are implicitly de¯ned by equa-
tion (10). For this purpose it is su±cient to show quasiconcavity of ¯rm
i's pro¯t given the other ¯rms invest xC
¡i, ¼i(xi;xC
¡i), which we do in the
following.
Note that ¼i(xi;xC
¡i) is de¯ned piecewisely. For xi < xC
i , we have to
examine to pro¯t of ¯rm 1 (by convention the lowest capacity ¯rm) given
that x2 = x3 = ¢¢¢ = xn. Since this implies that µC2 = ¢¢¢ = µCn and thus it

















i (x;µ)dF(µ) ¡ K(x1)
For xi > xC
i , the pro¯t of ¯rm i is the pro¯t of the highest capacity ¯rm
(¯rm n according to our convention), given all other ¯rm have invested the

















n (x;µ)dF(µ) ¡ K(x1)
22(i) The shape of ¼i(xi;xC
¡i) for xi > xC
i : The second derivative of the



















<0 by A1 part (iv)
f(µ)dµ < 0: (28)
Note that the ¯rst term cancels out and the second term is negative by
concavity of the spot market pro¯t function (implied by assumption 1, part
(iv)). We ¯nd that for xi > xC
i , ¼i(xi;xC
¡i) is concave, which implies that
upwards deviations are not pro¯table.
(ii) The shape of ¼i(xi;xC
¡i) for xi < xC
i : This region is more di±cult
to analyze since the pro¯t function ¼1(x1;xC
¡1) is not concave. But we can
show quasiconcavity of ¼1(x1;xC
¡1). For this purpose we need the following
properties of marginal pro¯ts at stage two for the cases (C1) and (Cn) [that
can be derived from from equations (7)].














dx1 ¸ 0 for x0
1 < x00
1.
Proof (i) The ¯rst part holds due to the fact in case ¯rm 1 is constrained,
i. e. (µ ¸ µC1), ¯rm 1 would like to produce more than x1 for all demand
realizations µ ¸ µC1, which, however, is not possible due to the capacity
constraint.
(ii) The ¯rst inequality follows from concavity of the pro¯t functions in the
spot markets, which is implied by assumption 1, part (iv). Thus, the ¯rst
order condition at each spot-market is decreasing in x1 until ~ qC0
i , which
immediately yields the ¯rst inequality of part (ii). The second inequality
is due to the fact that in case all ¯rms are constrained, i. e. (µ 2 [µCn;µ]),
¯rm 1 would like to produce more for all demand realizations µ (which is not
possible because it is constrained). ¤
Now we can use property 2 in order to complete the proof of existence
(part I). We can show quasiconcavity of ¼1(x1;xC















22It is obvious that there is no incentive for any ¯rm to deviate such that it is uncon-
strained at µ. Thus, we only consider the case that all ¯rms are constrained at µ.


































































































dxi =0 [recall that µC1(xC)=µCn(xC)]
¸ 0:
To summarize, in part I we have shown that ¼i(xi;xC
i ) is quasiconcave.
We conclude that the ¯rst order condition given in lemma 1 indeed charac-
terizes equilibrium investment in the Cournot market game.
Part II: Uniqueness In this part we show that (i) xC is the unique sym-
metric equilibrium and (ii) that there are no asymmetric equilibria.
(i) xC is the unique symmetric equilibrium. If capacities are equal,
i. e. x0
1 = x0



























which is negative due to assumption 1 part (iv). Thus, since
d¼i(xC)
dxi = 0
and moreover ¼i(x) is concave along the symmetry line, no other symmetric
equilibrium can exist.
23Di®erentiation works as in (28).
24(ii) There cannot exist an asymmetric equilibrium. Any candidate for
an asymmetric equilibrium ^ x can be ordered such that ^ x1 · ^ x2 · ¢¢¢ · ^ xn,
where at least one inequality has to hold strictly. This implies ^ x1 < ^ xn. The
pro¯t of ¯rm n can be obtained by setting i = n in equation (8), and the










It is easy to show that ¯rm n's pro¯t function is concave by examination of
the second derivative [see equation (28)]. Thus, any asymmetric equilibrium
^ x, if it exists, must satisfy
d¼n(^ x)
dxn = 0. We now show that whenever it holds
that
d¼n(^ x)
dxn = 0, ¯rm 1's pro¯t is increasing in x1 at ^ x (which implies that no
asymmetric equilibria exist).
From equation (9) it follows that the ¯rst derivative of ¯rm 1's pro¯t
















Note that all the integrals in
d¼1
dx1 are positive since ¯rm 1 is constrained at











where the RHS are simply the last two terms of
d¼1
dx1. Note furthermore that
^ x1 < ^ xn also implies that Kx(^ x1) < Kx(^ xn) (due to assumption 2) and
d¼1(^ x)
dx1
= P(^ x;µ) + Pq(^ x;µ)^ x1 ¡ Cq(^ x1;µ) < P(^ x;µ) + Pq(^ x;µ)^ xn ¡ Cq(^ xn;µ) =
d¼n(^ x)
dxn















f(µ)dµ ¡ Kx(xn) = 0:
The last equality is due to the fact that this part is equivalent to the ¯rst
order condition of ¯rm n, which is satis¯ed at ^ x by construction. To Sum-
marize, we have shown that
d¼1
dx1 > 0, which implies that there exist no asym-
metric equilibria, since at any equilibrium candidate, ¯rm 1 has an incentive
to increase its capacity.
25A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Part I: Existence Note that on a compact set any continuous function
has at least one global maximum. The result applies to our setup since
W(x;qFB) is continuous and x 2 [0;Q(µ)]. Now it remains to show that the
optimal investment levels cannot be asymmetric (see part II) and that the
symmetric solution as characterized in lemma 2 is unique (see part III).
Part II: Symmetry We ¯rst show that the optimal capacity choices can-
not be asymmetric across ¯rms. We start at the ¯rst order condition (16),
which at the optimal solution has to hold simultaneously for all ¯rms. It can










dF (µ) ¡ Kx (xi) (29)
Let us ¯rst de¯ne the relevant industry marginal cost function,, given the
capacities chosen by the ¯rms, x. Note that in any of the cases FBm, m =
1;:::;n, the unconstrained ¯rms produce the same in the socially optimal
solution. Thus, in case FB0, the relevant industry marginal cost is given by
Cq(
Q
n;µ). Increasing Q leads, at some point, to a situation where x1 =
Q
n. A
further increase of Q then has to be produced by ¯rms 2 to n, and thus, from
here on industry marginal cost is given by C(
Q¡x1
n¡1 ;µ). Continuation of this
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if Q 2 [
Pm¡1
i=1 xi + (n ¡ m + 1)xm;
Pm
i=1 xi + (n ¡ m)xm+1)
1 if Q 2 [
Pn
i=1 xi;1)
Now we can rewrite maximal social welfare generated in case FBm (given












































26Now we can compute the derivatives that we need in order to analyze the
¯rst order conditions given by (29). First note that dWFBm
dxi = 0 whenever
i > m, i. e. ¯rm i is not constrained in case FBm. Thus, for the highets
capacity ¯rm, ¯rm n, we get that only dWFBn
dxi 6= 0, that is
dW FBn
dxn
= P(X;µ) ¡ Cq(xn;µ): (30)
Thus, according to (29) it must hold for the highest capacity ¯rm that
Z µ
µFBn(x)
[P(X;µ) ¡ Cq(xn;µ)]dF(µ) ¡ Kx(xn) = 0: (31)
Now suppose that one of the inequalities in x·x2 · ¢¢¢ · xn is strict, such



















































































































Consequently, it cannot be that in the social optimum ¯rm 1 invests less
than ¯rms n.
Part III: Uniqueness We now show that there can be no other symmetric
equilibrium than xFB. If capacities are equal, i. e. x0
1 = x0




























Note that the second term is equal to zero, since x0 is the unconstrained
¯rst best solution at demand realization µCn(x0). Thus, we are left with the











dxi = 0, it follows that
dW(x0;qFB)
dxi > (<)0 for x0
i < (>)xFB
i .
Thus, no other symmetric optimal solution can exist and XFB is the unique
welfare maximizing investment level.
A.3 Proof of Remark 1
If ¯rms act as price takers at stage two, outputs coincide with the welfare
maximizing quantities characterized in equation (12). Thus, a ¯rm i's stage
two{pro¯t in scenario µ if ¯rms have invested x and m ¯rms turn out to be






















if i > m:
The stage one expected pro¯t of ¯rm i is obtained by integrating over all









i (x;µ)dF(µ) ¡ K (xi) (32)
Analogously to equation (16), the ¯rst order condition of ¯rm i's maximiza-












dF (µ) ¡ Kx (xi);
24Note that we assume that ¯rms ignore their impact on X since they behave perfectly
competitive. In this case, concavity of (32) is easy to establish.
28Note that the investment levels cannot be asymmetric by the following argu-
ment: Suppose that ¯rm n invests strictly more than ¯rm 1. The ¯rst order




















[P(X;µ) ¡ Cq(xn;µ)]dF (µ) ¡ Kx (xn) ´ 0:
Thus, ¯rm 1 would like to increase its investment whenever it is lower than
¯rm n's. Consequently, we have a unique solution, which must be the same
for each ¯rm. Let xn = ( 1
nXN;:::; 1
nXN) denote the capacities invested by
the n non{strategic ¯rms. Since all ¯rms face the same ¯rst order condition,
























Comparison with condition (17) implies that the investment level if ¯rms do
not behave strategically coincides with the welfare optimal investment level
(as characterized in lemma 2), i. e. XFB = XN.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
The structure of the proof is equivalent to the proof of lemma 2. The welfare
function in the case of Cournot competition at stage has exactly the same
structure as welfare if the social optimum is implemented at stage two. As
in the proof of lemma 2, the derivative of the welfare in a scenario Cm can
be pinned down by using industry marginal cost. The only di®erence is that
in the analysis, the Cournot equilibrium quantities qCm, QCm of the uncon-
strained players have to be substituted for the socially optimal quantities of
the unconstrained players, qFBm, QFBm, that have been used in the analysis
of the welfare optimum. We get
dW Cm (x;µ)
dx1



















Note that in case of Cournot competition at stage two the last term is strictly
positive. The remainder of the proof is equivalent to the proof of lemma 2.
29A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
(i) First note that
d¼i
dxi > 0 at X = 0 (by equation (1)), that
d¼i
dxi < 0 for some
¯nite value of X (by assumption 1 part (i)), and that
d¼i
dxi is continuous. Thus,
a corner solution is not possible, and we have at least one point where (24)
is satis¯ed and
d¼i
dxi is decreasing. Note, however, that this does not assure
existence. In fact, in the scenario considered here a ¯rm's stage one pro¯t is
not even quasiconcave, and it is not possible to reformulate the game as a
supermodular game.
(ii) First note that in the case of constant marginal costs it is, independently
of the capacity choices ¯rms made at stage one, always true that either all
¯rms are constrained at p = Cq(¢;µ), or none of them. Thus, it holds that
µFB1(x) = ¢¢¢ = µFBn(x).
In order to prove the second part of the lemma we apply theorem 2.1 of
Amir and Lambson (2000), p. 239. They show that the standard Cournot
oligopoly game has at least one symmetric equilibrium and no asymmetric
equilibria whenever demand P(¢) is continuously di®erentiable and decreas-
ing, cost C(¢) is twice continuously di®erentiable and nondecreasing and,
moreover, the cross partial derivative
d¼(X;q)
dX¡idX > 0, where X denotes total
capacity and X¡i capacity chosen by the ¯rms other than i. In order to
see that the results of Amir and Lambson apply to our setup, note that our
game is equivalent to a game where ¯rms choose output given the expected
demand and cost function. Note that if the ¯rst best outcome occurs when-













P (X;µ)dF (µ); (34)













C (xi;µ)dF (µ) + K (xi);(35)
Note that EP(X) is strictly decreasing in X and EC(xi) is strictly in-
creasing in xi, but they do not satisfy assumption 1, part (iv), which is why
existence and uniqueness are not implied by standard (textbook) analysis.25
25In fact, the expected pro¯t function is not even quasiconcave, as it is easily seen by
inspecting its second derivative. Those observations point to an error in the article of
Reynolds and Wilson (2000). They make almost the same assumptions on demand as we
do, but are more restrictive regarding cost (i. e. Cq(xi) = 0 and K(xi) = kxi). They state




















is positive. This guarantees that we have at least one symmetric equilibrium
and no asymmetric equilibria in case of constant marginal cost.
B The "Certainty Equivalent Game"
As already mentioned, our analysis of imperfect competition in section 3
covers a contribution by Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) who analyzed the
imperfect competition scenario with linear demand and deterministic and
constant marginal cost for a discrete distribution over demand realizations.
In order to relate our results more closely to theirs, in the following we
consider the game to which they compare capacities chosen in the imperfect
competition scenario (lemma 3). In this hypothetical game, which they call
the "Certainty Equivalent Game", ¯rms are assumed to choose production
given the expected demand. However, rather than throwing away what they
cannot (or do not want to) sell in low demand scenarios, they have to sell
the quantity they chose at any price (in particular also at negative prices).27
Since the demand function we de¯ned does not allow for negative prices we
de¯ne an extended demand function ^ P(Q;µ) that coincides with P(Q;µ) for
all Q · Q(µ) and that may become negative for Q > Q(µ). ^ P is assumend
to satisfy assumption 1, parts (ii) to (vi) for all Q;qi 2 [0;1).28
(p.126 of the article) that E[xiP(xi + x¡i;µ) ¡ kxi] (in our notation) is strictly concave
and di®erentiable in xi and therefore has a unique solution. Since E[xiP(xi+x¡i;µ)¡kxi]
is exactly the pro¯t given by equation (32) for Cq(xi) = 0 and K(xi) = kxi, our analysis
in section 5.2 shows that this is not true.
26The assumptions are: P(¢) is continuously di®erentiable with Pq(¢) < 0, C(¢) is twice
continuously di®erentiable and nondecreasing, and Pq(X) ¡ Cqq(xi) < 0.
27This can also be implemented by intervention at stage two, namely if the regulator
prohibits withholding of capacity at any demand scenario. In the formulation of Gab-
szewicz and Poddar demand is linear and becomes negative for capacities higher than
demand at price zero. This corresponds to the assumption of considerable destruction
cost in case of excess capacity, which does not seem plausible in most cases. We discuss
alternative concepts of the certainty equivalent game (where prices are bounded below by
zero) in a companion paper (Grimm and Zoettl (2006)).
28Note that while Gabzewicz and Poddar consider linear demand, in our model the slope
of the demand function may considerably change as prices become negative. This allows
31In our terminology the requirement that capacity is always sold, whatever
the price is, implies that ¯rms are never "unconstrained". Thus, in order to






^ P(X;µ)xi ¡ C(xi;µ)
i
dF(µ) ¡ K(xi): (36)
Di®erentiation yields the ¯rst order condition as stated in the following30
Property 3 (The Certainty Equivalent Game) The "Certainty
Equivalent Game" has a unique equilibrium which is symmetric. Equilib-
rium investments xCE
i = 1























































which, analogously to the proof of theorem 1 allows us to show that XCE <
XORP.
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